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Abstract 
 
In earlier work, we asked subjects to report involuntary thoughts relating to a trauma 
film and also probed subjects periodically. Subjects often reported involuntary 
thoughts in response to probes, suggesting they lacked meta-awareness of those 
thoughts. But it is possible that some or all probe-detected thoughts were 
continuations of thoughts subjects had spontaneously reported, leading us to 
overestimate involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness. It is also unclear whether 
failures in meta-awareness occur for other emotional events. We exposed subjects to a 
negative or positive film. Subsequently, they reported involuntary film-related 
thoughts and responded to probes that distinguished new from continuing thoughts. 
Many (54%) but not all probe-caught thoughts were thought continuations. This result 
supports our earlier finding that people can lack meta-awareness for trauma-related 
thoughts, but suggests caution in how meta-awareness is assessed. We also found that 
self-caught negative and positive involuntary thoughts occurred at a similar frequency, 
with different characteristics. 
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1 Introduction 
Involuntary memories are recollections that enter consciousness without any 
specific effort to retrieve them (Berntsen, 1996; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). These 
memories share some characteristics with other types of spontaneous thought 
processes, such as mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), remindings 
(Hintzman, 2011), “earworms” (Hyman et al., 2015), and traumatic flashbacks 
(Brewin, 2014). Recent research has focused on whether these phenomena are related, 
and how they might be differentiated (Kvavilashvili, 2014; Meyer, Otgaar & Smeets, 
2015; Takarangi, Lindsay, & Strange, 2015).  
Mind-wandering is the shift of attention from external information, such as an 
ongoing task, towards self-generated, internal information, such as thoughts and 
memories (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). These shifts in attention are frequent, 
perhaps occurring as often as half our waking lives (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). 
They can arise without deliberate intention (i.e., involuntarily), and lack meta-
awareness; in other words, when people are not explicitly aware that the current 
contents of their consciousness are “off-task” thoughts (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015). This phenomenon appears to extend to thoughts about negative 
autobiographical events (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013).  
People also sometimes lack meta-awareness of thoughts about analogue 
trauma. Takarangi et al. (2014) used the typical trauma film paradigm, whereby 
subjects watched a stressful film intended to cause involuntary thoughts (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). They then had subjects engage in a reading task during which they 
measured film-related mind-wandering (see Baird et al., 2013). Subjects indicated 
when they were aware of having a thought about the film (by pressing a computer 
key). To capture thoughts of which subjects were not aware, probes appeared 
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intermittently throughout the reading task (e.g., as in Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 
2004). Each probe asked subjects whether or not they had been thinking about the 
film at the moment the probe was presented. Along with spontaneously reporting 
involuntary thoughts from the film, subjects also sometimes responded “yes” to 
probes. According to Takarangi et al., these responses could indicate that subjects had 
been thinking about the film but had not yet become aware that they were doing so. If 
the frequency of involuntary thoughts extends beyond that which a subject can 
accurately self-report, there may be important implications for research on and 
treatment of maladaptive intrusions. One example is how involuntary thoughts—such 
as those that arise from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)—are captured and 
addressed.   
A limitation of Takarangi et al.’s (2014) study is that some or all of what they 
classified as “probe-caught” involuntary thoughts might really have been non-
reported (but meta-aware) continuations of a previously self-caught thought. In other 
words, it is possible that subjects may have self-reported thinking about the film and 
then continued to ruminate about that thought until the next probe appeared. In these 
cases subjects’ “yes” responses to probes would not represent failures in meta-
awareness. If this explanation is accurate, then the rate of probe-caught involuntary 
thoughts Takarangi et al. reported may exaggerate the rate of subjects’ genuine 
failures in meta-awareness of thoughts about the trauma film. Of course, it is 
important that probe-caught methods accurately identify failures in meta-awareness. 
Thus, in the present study we altered the probe instructions so that we could identify 
whether subjects had a previously reported thought in mind when they responded to 
probes. Hence, our first question in the current study is: Do involuntary thoughts 
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classified as lacking meta-awareness sometimes reflect the non-reported (but meta-
aware) continuation of a previously self-caught thought?  
If subjects do lack meta-awareness for involuntary thoughts about a negative 
event—in a similar way to instances of mind wandering without awareness—then it is 
also important to examine whether lapses in meta-awareness also characterize 
thoughts about other emotionally significant material. Some clinicians and theorists 
have argued that the process of remembering emotionally significant events—that are 
typically negative or traumatic—is different to that of ordinary, everyday experiences; 
in particular, some have argued that memory for emotional experiences involves a 
“special” mechanism (e.g., “flashbulb memories”; Brown & Kulik, 1977; see also 
Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997, for a review) or an absence of certain elements of normal 
memory processing.  For example, according to Brewin (2014) the emotional 
intensity and difficulty in conceptualizing traumatic events can lead to an incomplete 
narrative of those experiences. The result is a disjointed narrative in which voluntary 
retrieval of the memory is less prevalent than involuntary, unwanted memories.  
According to these models of trauma memory, an increase in involuntary 
memories is accompanied by an inability to recall memories voluntarily. Yet studies 
of voluntary and involuntary memory show that frequency of both types of memories 
correlate positively with PTSD symptoms (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008). Berntsen and 
Rubin (2008) argued that these involuntary thoughts reflect basic memory processes.  
Indeed, we know that recurrent, intrusive, and involuntary cognition also occurs for 
neutral and positive information.  For example, surveys, diary studies, and laboratory 
analogues (akin to the trauma film paradigm but with a positive film used as the target 
event) have shown that people also experience positive involuntary thoughts and 
memories (see Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Clark, Mackay, & Holmes, 2013; Davies, 
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Malik, Pictet, Blackwell, & Holmes, 2012). Do involuntary thoughts share underlying 
characteristics, such as meta-awareness, regardless of valence? That is the second 
question we address here.  
What do we know about the differences between positive and negative 
memories? Research indicates that there are differences in the frequency with which 
negative and positive involuntary memories are experienced. For example, using a 
diary method, Berntsen and Rubin (2008) found that positive involuntary memories 
were more common than negative involuntary memories in daily life. Similarly, when 
probed with questions about their past, people recalled both positive and negative 
autobiographical memories, with a clear reminiscence bump—remembering more 
personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than other periods of life—for 
positive memories. When questioned about the content of their last involuntary 
memory, subjects were more likely to report positive memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2002). However, this bias toward positive involuntary cognition can be reversed. 
There is evidence that negative cues (e.g., “childhood nightmares”) more often trigger 
an involuntary autobiographical memory than positive cues (“going on holiday”), or 
neutral cues (“buttering bread”; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Thus, when 
positive and negatives cues are equally available—as in a controlled laboratory study, 
where there is an equivalent number of each—the negative cues may be more likely 
to trigger involuntary memories.   
It may be that prior findings of differences in the frequencies of positive 
versus negative involuntary memories reflect a difference in meta-awareness of 
thoughts. On the one hand, negative involuntary thoughts might be characterized by 
stronger meta-awareness than other involuntary cognitions, due to their nature as 
intrusive and distressing, or because negative memories are subject to special 
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processing (e.g., Brewin, 2014). Our previous data suggest that people experience at 
least some negative involuntary thoughts without meta-awareness, but it might be that 
positive involuntary thoughts are even more likely to occur without meta-awareness. 
On the other hand, perhaps people are actually more meta-aware of their positive 
involuntary thoughts.  If so, then that could explain their apparent accessibility in 
everyday life. 
To summarize, we address two main questions in this study: Did involuntary 
thoughts defined as “probe-caught” in Takarangi et al.’s (2014) procedure sometimes 
reflect non-reported (but meta-aware) continuations of a previously self-caught 
thought? And (2) Does the distinction between meta-aware and unaware thoughts 
occur similarly for both negative and positive emotional material? To address (1), we 
re-worded the probes used by Takarangi et al. so that we could differentiate between 
(a) thoughts that the subject was not aware of having until probed versus (b) 
continuation of thoughts for which the subject had already reported awareness. To 
address (2), we followed previous research that has successfully elicited positive 
involuntary thoughts via the use of a positive film paradigm (e.g., Clark et al., 2013). 
We also followed Takarangi et al.’s general procedure: Subjects first watched a film 
of either positive or negative emotional valence, then reported their thoughts while 
completing an unrelated task, during which intermittent probes prompted subjects to 
report the current contents of their thoughts. 
2 Method 
2.1 Subjects 
We recruited 90 subjects from the research subject pool at Flinders University. 
We excluded three subjects; two because they had seen the film before and one for 
not following instructions. Thus, our analyses focused on data from 87 subjects, aged 
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18-38 years (M = 21.41 SD = 5.41). The majority (78.2%) were female and identified 
their ethnicity as Caucasian (including White; 75.9%). Others identified as Asian 
(12.6%), European (4.6%), Middle Eastern (2.3%), Hispanic (1.1%), and mixed 
ethnic origin (3.4%). Subjects received either course credit or cash payment (AUD 
$30) for their time.   
2.2 Design 
Approximately half of our subjects watched a traumatic film (n = 42), the 
remaining subjects watched a positive film (n = 45) described below. Our key 
dependent variables were the number of self-caught involuntary thoughts and probe-
caught involuntary thoughts, which we divided into two types: thought continuations 
that subjects had already self-reported (meta-aware), and new thoughts (not meta-
aware). 
2.3 Materials and procedure 
The Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at Flinders University 
approved this research. Subjects took part in one laboratory-based session. Before 
commencing the study, we told subjects we were interested in how aspects of 
executive cognition affect the processing of negative events. Subjects were tested 
individually. We warned all subjects in the negative film condition that participation 
could involve viewing a brief film depicting sexual and physical violence.  
2.3.1. Phase 1 After subjects gave consent to continue with the study, we 
collected demographic information and assessed subjects’ mood using the 20-item 
version of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Subjects rated their current feelings along 10 positive (e.g., 
“enthusiastic”) and 10 negative (e.g., “nervous”) dimensions on a 5-point scale (1 = 
very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). The PANAS has good internal reliability 
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with a Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .86 to .90 for positive affect and from .84 to .87 
for negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). We also measured subjects’ subjective 
ratings of their overall proneness to intrusive cognition and tendency to suppress such 
cognition, using single-item measures (Davies & Clark, 1998). The Proneness to 
Intrusive Cognitions Scale (PICS) item asked: “After you have seen something 
unpleasant on the television or at the cinema, do you find that it comes back into your 
mind without you wanting it to?” (0=not at all, 10=always). The Thought Suppression 
Scale (TSS) item asked: “When something unpleasant has happened in your life, to 
what extent is the following statement true of you?...I make an effort not to think 
about it” (0=not at all true of me, 10=true of me). Finally, we used the 8-item 
Frequency of Involuntary Thoughts Scale (Hyman et al., 2015) to assess people’s 
general propensity to experience involuntary thoughts. This scale asks people how 
often various types of thoughts (e.g., visual images, memories, thoughts about money, 
etc.) come to mind involuntarily, defined in the questionnaire as without choosing to 
think about them. Ratings for each thought type are made on a Likert-type scale: (1 = 
never, 2 = almost never, 3 = a few times per month, 4 = a few times per week, 5 = a 
few times each day, 6 = constantly). Cronbach’s α for our sample = .77.  
 2.3.2 Phase 2 We next presented subjects with either the positive or negative 
film, which they viewed on iMac computer screens, using headphones. For the 
traumatic film, we used a scene from ‘‘The Accused’’ (1988). The film depicts a 
woman in a bar being sexually assaulted by a group of men, and has been successfully 
used as a trauma analogue in previous research (Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, Ragan, 
& Ramos, 2004; Takarangi et al., 2014). For the positive film, we used footage of an 
American figure skater, Sarah Hughes, winning an Olympic gold medal. The footage 
depicts the skater’s flawless routine and the surprise and joy on her face when she 
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finds out that she won the gold medal. Other researchers have used this footage to 
elicit "happiness" and other positive emotions in subjects (Gruber, Johnson, Oveis, & 
Keltner, 2008; Gruber, Oveis, Keltner, & Johnson, 2011; Werner et al., 2007). Both 
films ran for 8 min 3 s. 
2.3.3 Phase 3 After the film, we asked subjects whether they had seen the film 
before, and to rate on an 11-point Likert-type scales (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) 
(a) how unpleasant they found the film, (b) how distressed they felt after it, and (c) 
how closely they paid attention to it. We also re-administered the 20-item PANAS.  
2.3.4 Phase 4 We asked subjects to read a seven-paragraph science article, 
presented one paragraph at a time (with 112-231 words per paragraph), followed by a 
multiple-choice comprehension test. Subjects read the article at their own pace, 
pressing the space bar to advance through the paragraphs. The article was followed by 
a 10-item multiple-choice comprehension test (e.g., How much blood does your heart 
need to pump in an hour?). During the reading task, we measured subjects’ 
involuntary thoughts in two ways. We asked subjects to press a key whenever they 
found themselves thinking about the film, and then try to bring their focus back to the 
reading task. In addition, probes appeared periodically on screen (8-150s between 
probes with an average of one probe every 30s, and asked subjects what they were 
thinking the moment before the probe appeared (see Baird et al., 2013). Subjects 
received 11.54 (SD = 2.71, range 8-25) probes on average. More specifically, we gave 
the following instructions verbally to subjects just before they began the reading task: 
From time to time you will see a blue screen asking what you were just 
thinking about in the moment just before the blue screen popped up. You will 
be asked to use the number keys 1-3 to respond. If you are aware that you are 
STILL thinking about the film since when you last pressed the “x” key, then 
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please choose that response that you were STILL thinking about the film. If 
you are thinking about the film AGAIN (or for the very first time), but had not 
realized it until the blue screen appeared, then please choose the response that 
you were AGAIN thinking about the film. In the case of thinking AGAIN 
about the film, the thought you are experiencing may be the same or a 
different thought than what you had experienced previously. If you are not 
thinking about the film, please select the response that you were NOT thinking 
about the film.  
Subjects spent on average 7.25 mins (SD = 2.31) on the reading task. There was no 
difference in reading duration by film condition, t < 1.  
2.3.5 Phase 5 After the reading task, we again measured subjects’ mood using 
the 20-item version of the PANAS. We also assessed their experience of involuntary 
thoughts using the Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, 
Park, & Litz, 2009). Subjects rated the frequency (one item) of their involuntary 
thoughts during the reading task (0 = almost never, 1 = infrequently, 2 = occasionally, 
3 = frequently, 4 = very frequently), as well as the phenomenology of those thoughts 
(four items): the extent to which they created interference and distress, and were 
unpredictable and unwanted (0 = not at all, 1 = a little, 2 = moderately, 3 = quite a bit, 
4 = extremely). Previous psychometric examination indicates that the EIS has good 
internal consistency values and convergent validity with PCL scores (Salters-
Pedneault et al., 2009). We also found high internal consistency in our EIS data: α = 
0.87.  
We then asked subjects a series of questions, again using 11-point Likert-type 
scales (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely): (a) How distressed they were by any thoughts, 
pictures/images of the film that may have entered their mind since watching the film, 
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(b) how hard they tried NOT to think about the film since watching it, (c) How well 
they adhered to the instructions to record intrusive thoughts; (d) How accurate they 
were in responding to probes, (e) how difficult they found the reading task, and (f) 
how interesting they found the reading task. We also asked subjects open-ended 
questions (not analyzed here) to establish: that they understood the probe instructions 
(“When answering the questions about what you were thinking before the blue screen 
appeared: (a) I said I was “still” thinking about the film when… (b) I said I was 
“again” thinking about the film when…”); the nature of the most frequent intrusive 
thought they experienced after viewing the film.  
At the conclusion of the study, subjects were thanked and debriefed. 
3 Results and discussion 
Recall that our study had two primary aims: We were interested first in 
whether our method accurately captured involuntary thoughts for which subjects 
lacked meta-awareness; and second, whether subjects experience similar patterns of 
involuntary thoughts after exposure to a positive vs. negative event. Before addressing 
these aims, we established that there were no significant group differences in the 
degree to which subjects reported following instructions for self- and probe-caught 
thought monitoring, or in baseline levels of propensity to intrusions (as measured by 
PICS), and thought suppression (as measured by TSS) (see Table 1). We next 
assessed the emotional impact of our films.  
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for subjects’ reactions to the films, by 
film condition. 
 Negative film 
(M, SD) 
Positive film t (85) p value Cohen’s d [95% CIs] 
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(M, SD) 
Adherence to 
instructions (self-
caught) 
6.98 (3.07) 7.04 (2.71) 0.11 0.913 .02 [-0.40, 0.44] 
Adherence to 
instructions (probe-
caught) 
8.60 (1.42) 7.93 (2.34) 1.58 0.117 .34 [-0.09, 0.76] 
Proneness to 
Intrusions Scale 
(PICS) 
5.33 (2.49) 5.56 (2.78) 0.39 0.696 .08 [-0.34, 0.51] 
Thought 
Suppression Scale 
(TSS) 
5.29 (2.33) 5.24 (2.58) 0.08 0.938 0.02 [-0.40, 0.44] 
Film unpleasantness 8.83 (1.65) 0.36 (0.96) 29.54 < .001 6.28 [5.29, 7.37] 
Distress from film 6.90 (2.64) 0.27 (0.72) 16.24 < .001 3.45 [2.81, 4.15] 
Distress at 
involuntary thoughts 
1.79 (1.14) 0.44 (0.84) 6.15 < .001 1.31 [0.85, 1.78] 
Suppression attempt 5.83 (3.03) 4.60 (3.24) 1.83 0.070 0.39 [-0.03, 0.82] 
Attention to film 8.24 (1.34) 8.04 (1.52) 0.63 0.532 0.13 [-0.29, 0.56] 
 
3.1. Emotional impact of the films 
We first examined whether the films differentially affected subjects’ mood. 
We compared subjects in the positive versus negative film conditions over time, on 
both positive and negative affect. More specifically, we ran two 2 (film condition: 
positive, negative) × 3 (Time: before-film, after-film, after-reading) mixed ANOVA 
analyses. Focusing first on positive affect, as shown in Fig. 1a, there was a significant 
interaction between time and film, F(2, 170) = 41.73, p < 0.001, partial η2 = .33. 
Planned comparisons revealed that for subjects who watched the positive film, 
positive affect increased significantly from baseline to immediately after the film, 
t(44) = -3.83, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.20, 0.71], and then fell below 
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baseline following the reading task,  t(44)=3.86, p < 0.001, d = 0.38, 95% CI [0.17, 
0.59]. Conversely, subjects who viewed the negative film reported a decrease in 
positive affect after watching the film, t(41) = 8.49 p < 0.001, d = 1.16, 95% CI [0.80, 
1.55], which did not change significantly during the reading task, t(41) = -1.46, p = 
0.152, d = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.38] 
   
Figure 1a. Positive affect changes at initial measure, following film, and after reading task by film valence 
condition. Error bars represent 95% within subjects confidence intervals.  
 
We next examined negative affect. As shown in Figure 1b, there was a 
significant interaction between time and film, F(2, 170) = 45.49, p < 0.001, partial η2 
= 0.35. For people who watched the negative film, negative affect increased from 
baseline to after the film t(41) = 7.96, p < 0.001, d = 1.40, 95% CI [0.95, 1.89], and 
then decreased following the reading task, but not to baseline levels t(41) = 7.50, p < 
10
15
20
25
30
Before-film After-film After-reading
PA
N
A
S 
Po
sit
iv
e A
ffe
ct
 S
co
re
Time point
Positive film
Negative film
TRAUMA-RELATED VS. POSITIVE INVOLUNTARY THOUGHTS   
 15 
0.001, d= 0.55, 95% CI [0.20, 0.92]. Negative affect was unchanged in the positive 
film condition over time, F(1, 44) = 2.15, p = 0.150, partial η2 = 0.05. 
 
Figure 1b. Negative affect changes at initial measure, following film, and after reading task by film valence 
condition. Error bars represent 95% within subjects confidence intervals. 
 
3.2 Reactions to the films 
We next examined subjects’ ratings of the film, which they reported 
immediately after watching it. As we expected, subjects reported that the negative 
film was more unpleasant and distressing than the positive film, and that involuntary 
thoughts about the negative film were more distressing. There was a non-significant 
tendency for subjects to report trying harder not to think about the negative compared 
to the positive film, but the two conditions reported paying a similar level of attention 
to the films.  
3.3 Meta-awareness of Intrusions 
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We next examined our first primary research question: does our method 
accurately capture involuntary thoughts for which people lack meta-awareness? More 
specifically, we wanted to identify probe-caught thoughts that were versus were not 
simply continuations of previously self-caught thoughts. We focused first on subjects 
who watched the negative film. Recall that the film and reading task were identical to 
Takarangi et al. (2014; Experiment 2). Overall, subjects were “caught” thinking about 
the film on 35.79% (95% CI [27.43, 44.14]) of probes. This rate is comparable to the 
rate found in Takarangi et al. (39.48%). We then divided probe-caught thoughts into 
two categories: involuntary thoughts subjects claimed they had already reported 
(hereafter “continuing probe-caught thoughts”) were reported on an average of 
18.99% [13.09, 24.90] of the probes; new thoughts, of which subjects were 
presumably not meta-aware, were reported on an average of 16.79% [12.21, 21.37] of 
the probes (see Fig. 2). Thus, Takarangi et al. almost certainly overestimated the rate 
of analogue trauma-related involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness, due to 
“double-counting” self-caught thoughts as probe-caught. But nearly half of probe-
caught thoughts were described as new thoughts that subjects had not previously 
reported. 
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Figure 2. Frequency of probe-caught involuntary thoughts by film valence condition and probe response type. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
3.4 Negative vs. positive film involuntary thoughts 
We next turned to the question of whether subjects experience a similar 
pattern of involuntary thoughts after exposure to a positive versus negative event. 
First, we examined involuntary thoughts that subjects self-caught. We used a log-
transformation to correct for positive skew in the distribution of self-caught responses. 
Subjects who viewed the positive film self-caught a similar number of involuntary 
thoughts (M = 0.54, 95% CI [0.42, 0.65]) compared to subjects who viewed the 
negative film (M = 0.58 [0.47, 0.70]), t(85) = 0.58, p = 0.563, d = .12 [-0.30, 0.55]. 
(Untransformed data: Positive film: M = 4.00, 95% CI [2.68, 5.31] negative film M = 
4.29 [2.96, 5.61], d = 0.07 [-0.36, 0.49]). We ran an independent-sample Bayesian t-
test with default Cauchy prior (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) on 
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the number of self-caught involuntary thoughts in each condition to quantify the 
certainty of this similarity. We found a BF01 = 4.28. Adhering to the statistical 
interpretation that Wetzels, et al. (2011) suggest, this Bayes factor indicates moderate 
evidence that the difference between the self-caught involuntary thoughts by 
condition is negligible. Put differently, these data are 4.28 times more likely to occur 
if the null hypothesis is true than if self-caught thoughts differ by condition (Wetzels 
et al., 2011). Thus, people experienced a similar number of involuntary thoughts 
about the positive and negative videos. 
We also wanted to know if thoughts about the negative versus positive film 
were distinguishable on other characteristics. The Experience of Intrusions Scale 
(EIS) assesses thought frequency combined with the extent to which those thoughts 
led to interference and distress, and were unpredictable and unwanted. A t-test 
revealed that subjects in the negative film condition had higher EIS scores (M = 11.09, 
95% CI [9.73, 12.46]) compared to subjects in the positive film condition (M = 8.00, 
[6.53, 9.47]), t(85) = 3.10, p = 0.003, d = 0.66 [0.23, 1.10]. Thus, despite an 
equivalent number of self-caught involuntary thoughts, subjects in the negative film 
condition rated their involuntary thoughts as qualitatively different from subjects in 
the positive film condition.  
Next, we compared subjects in the positive and negative film conditions on 
probe-caught involuntary thoughts. Overall, subjects who watched the positive film 
were caught thinking about the film on 29.92% (95% CI [21.85, 37.99]) of probes. 
This rate was not significantly different from the 35.79% for subjects in the negative 
condition t(85) = 1.00., p = .318 , d = 0.20 [-0.22, 0.63]. As with the negative film, 
probe-caught responses appeared to capture both continuing and new thoughts about 
the positive film. Specifically, subjects were caught having continuing involuntary 
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thoughts about the positive film on 15.93% [10.22, 21.63] of the probes; they reported 
having new involuntary thoughts on 13.99% [9.57, 18.42] of the probes (see Fig. 2). 
The rate of new (without meta-awareness) involuntary thoughts for the positive and 
negative films was similar, t(85) = 0.87, p = 0.385, d = 0.12 [-0.31, 0.54]. We ran an 
independent-sample Bayesian t-test with default Cauchy prior (Rouder et al., 2009), 
and found a BF01 = 3.19, which once again indicates moderate evidence that the 
difference between the new probe-caught thoughts in each condition is negligible 
(Wetzels et al. 2011). That is, these data are 3.19 times more likely to occur than if the 
null hypothesis is true than if new probe-caught thoughts differ by condition (Wetzels 
et al., 2011). These data indicate that the presence of thoughts lacking meta-awareness 
is not associated exclusively with negative material, but extends to other emotional 
events.   
Finally, we examined whether the frequency of self-caught and new probe-
caught thoughts were related to the EIS, which captures the phenomenological 
experience of involuntary cognition, particularly its intrusiveness. Self-caught 
thoughts correlated with the EIS for both the negative (r = 0.38, 95% CI [0.09, 0.61]), 
p = 0.012 and positive film (r = 0.60 [0.37, 0.76], p < 0.001) conditions. Similarly, the 
frequency of new probe-caught thoughts were also correlated with the EIS for both 
the negative (r = 0.45, 95% CI [0.17, 0.66], p = 0.003) and positive film (r = 0.49 
[0.23, 0.69], p < 0.001) conditions. Additionally the frequency of continuing probe-
caught thoughts correlated with EIS for both negative (r = 0.60 [0.36, 0.77], p<.001) 
and positive film (r = 0.64 [0.42, 0.78], p < 0.001). These data suggest that the 
frequency with which involuntary thoughts are experienced, regardless of their 
valence, contributes to the extent those thoughts feel intrusive (see Hyman et al., 
2015). Of course, the EIS does incorporate a retrospective assessment of frequency 
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and—since it is completed after the reading task—captures both thoughts about which 
subjects had meta-awareness at the time of reporting, and those thoughts that were 
brought to their meta-awareness by probes.   
3.5 Reading comprehension performance 
Subjects’ performance on the reading comprehension test was similar in the 
negative film (M = 0.57, 95% CI [0.50, 0.64]) and positive film (M = 0.55, [0.50, 
0.60]) conditions, t < 1. We calculated a partial correlation between self-caught 
involuntary thoughts and reading comprehension performance, controlling for overall 
time spent reading. There was no significant relationship, in either the negative film (r 
= -0.02, 95% CI [-0.32, .29], p = 0.917) or positive film (r = -0.08 [-0.37, 0.22], p = 
0.606) conditions. We next calculated the correlation between the frequency of new 
probe-caught intrusions and performance. Again, there was no significant relationship 
in either condition (negative film: r = -0.23 [-0.50, 0.08], p = 0.141); positive film: r = 
-0.04 [-0.33, 0.26], p = 0.814). Interestingly then, mind-wandering about the films 
without meta-awareness did not appear to impair attention to the reading task. 
3.6 Individual differences 
We next examined whether frequency of involuntary thoughts, with or without 
meta-awareness, was related to our baseline measurements of proneness to intrusive 
cognition (PICS), involuntary cognition (FITS), and thought suppression (TSS), using 
correlations. As shown in Table 2, there was a consistent directional positive 
association between proneness to intrusive cognition and all measures of involuntary 
thoughts for the film(s). However, only the relationship between PICS and self-caught 
negative film thoughts was statistically significant.   
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Table 2 
Correlations between measures of involuntary thought and baseline individual 
differences, by film condition. 
Response type Film condition PICS TSS FITS  
Self-caught Negative 0.38 [0.08, 
0.61]* 
0.28 [-0.03, 0.54] 0.11 [-0.20, 
0.40] 
 
 Positive 0.25 [-0.05, 
0.51] 
-0.05 [-0.34, 0.25] -0.11 [-0.39, 
0.19] 
 
Probe-caught 
(continuation) 
Negative 0.27 [-0.53, 
0.04] 
0.07 [-0.24, 0.36] 0.15 [-0.16, 
0.43] 
 
Positive 0.19 [-0.11, 
0.46] 
0.12 [-0.18, 0.40] -0.20 [-0.47, 
0.10] 
 
Probe-caught 
(new) 
Negative 0.26 [-0.04, 
0.53] 
-0.06 [-0.36, 0.25] -0.004 [-0.31, 
0.30] 
 
Positive 0.25 [-0.05, 
0.50]  
0.08 [-0.22, 0.37] 0.17 [-0.14, 
0.44] 
 
Note: *p < 0.05,.  The correlations with self-caught intrusions controlled for overall time spent on the reading task.  
 
3.7 Summary and implications 
To summarize, our data reveal three important findings, with several 
implications for future research. First, self-caught measures do not capture all 
involuntary thoughts. This result is consistent with Takarangi et al.’s (2014) finding 
that subjects are not always meta-aware of their own thoughts about an analogue 
trauma. Second, using probes to alert subjects to thoughts for which they lack meta-
awareness may overestimate the number of involuntary thoughts those subjects are 
experiencing. However, importantly, our results indicate that not all probe-caught 
thoughts overlap with self-caught thoughts. In other words, probes still do appear to 
capture thoughts of which subjects are yet to be meta-aware. Third, we found that 
involuntary thoughts about an emotional film stimulus occur at a similar frequency, 
and with similar meta-awareness, for both negative and positive emotional events. 
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However, subjects rated their experience of thoughts about the negative event 
differently; more akin to symptoms of PTSD. More specifically, PTSD is 
characterized by persistent, involuntary and unwanted thoughts about a trauma, 
including intense distress after exposure to traumatic reminders. Our subjects rated 
involuntary thoughts arising from the negative film as having these kinds of features, 
relative to involuntary thoughts arising from the positive film.   
Our findings have methodological implications. Self-report procedures are 
often used to capture re-experiencing symptoms of trauma, task-unrelated thoughts, 
and other involuntary thoughts and memories. However, we know from extensive 
research in the mind-wandering literature that people often lack meta-awareness of 
their own thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Our 
data adds to a growing body of evidence that self-report measures do not always 
accurately reflect involuntary thought experiences, and that probes can help bring 
these non meta-aware thoughts to consciousness. Indeed, we found that subjects were 
thinking about the film when asked about it, in the absence of self-report. Importantly 
however, our data also suggest that the probes may sometimes ‘double-count’ 
involuntary thought experiences that are already captured by self-report. Subjects in 
our study identified approximately half of probe-caught thoughts as continuations of 
previous self-reported thoughts. Hence, although using probes to investigate the 
presence of non meta-aware thoughts is essential for detecting such thoughts, our 
results highlight the importance of identifying unique thought experiences for which 
subjects genuinely lack meta-awareness.  Future research should therefore be cautious 
in how probe questions and potential responses are presented to and interpreted by 
subjects.  
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Our findings also have practical and theoretical implications. First, when the 
cues to a negative vs. positive stimulus were equally available and time since the 
event occurred held constant, as in previous lab research, we found no difference in 
self-caught involuntary thought frequency. In field research, people tend to report 
more positive than negative involuntary memories, which may reflect these 
methodological differences. For example, the emotions associated with negative 
memories tend to fade faster than the emotions associated with positive memories 
(fading affect bias; Walker, Vogal, & Thompson, 1997), and most people tend to 
encounter more positive than negative stimuli on a day-to-day basis, and we know 
that involuntary memories are most often triggered by environmental cues (Berntsen, 
1996; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). However, negative involuntary thoughts 
differed qualitatively, and this finding fits with other research showing that 
problematic negative thoughts are higher in emotional intensity than positive 
involuntary thoughts (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008). Moreover, in involuntary 
musical imagery research, although people typically report more liked than disliked 
songs as the most recent song stuck in their heads, when their most recent stuck song 
is from further in the past, they more likely to report the song as disliked (Hyman et 
al., 2013). Hyman et al. suggest that people may more easily remember negative 
intrusive experiences for a longer period of time.  
Our data also lend support to the idea that it is important to distinguish 
between the characteristics of involuntary thoughts —such as the distress they cause, 
feelings of intrusiveness, and interpretations of their meaning—and their frequency, 
when explaining problematic outcomes such as PTSD (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Steil & 
Ehlers, 2000). However, we also found that subjects were equally meta-aware of both 
negative and positive involuntary thoughts.  This finding lends support to the basic 
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mechanisms view of memory: traumatic involuntary thoughts are meta-cognitively 
similar to involuntary thoughts for positive events. However, we cannot rule out 
whether these patterns of meta-awareness are unique to emotional, as opposed to 
more neutral, material.  
Of course, our study has limitations: we used an analogue trauma, which may 
not be as generalizable to real life situations as using a real-life autobiographical event 
would be. Although analogue traumas have been shown to reliably induce involuntary 
thoughts in the short-term, the memories dissipate quickly, and are therefore not 
exactly synonymous with real-life traumatic experiences (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). 
Furthermore, an analogue positive event, although much easier to replicate, is also not 
synonymous with positive autobiographical experiences, which are likely to be more 
personally relevant and salient to people than an analogue positive experience. Thus, 
the observed difference between the events is likely to remain. We also focused on 
negative characteristics of cognition. Future studies could also use measures to 
specifically tap into positive feelings arising from a positive event. We used a non-
clinical population. It is possible that studying a population with a susceptibility to 
PTSD, or a subclinical population, may reveal more about the pattern of negative 
involuntary thoughts, and mechanisms that lead to these thoughts becoming 
problematic. It would be interesting to look at whether the same pattern of positive 
and negative involuntary thoughts held up within a subclinical, or clinical population. 
4 Conclusions 
We replicated Takarangi et al.’s (2014) study and found that subjects failed to 
recognize some of their involuntary thoughts about an emotional event. We also 
found that involuntary thoughts are equally frequent for both negative and positive 
events, but these memories differed in recall characteristics. Importantly, we found 
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that previous studies using probes to catch non meta-aware thoughts may have 
overestimated the number of non meta-aware thoughts. Future studies should include 
the opportunity for subjects to report the difference between a new and continuing 
thoughts when responding to probes.  
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